July 2008
CONFLICTS AND WARS OF THE FUTURE
Our successes at Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and during the conventional warfare phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 emphatically imparted on our enemies that we are capable of overpowering any opposing force today in conventional warfare. Our air superiority and high-tech weaponry – especially the destructive power of our armor force – made it a “no brainer” for our enemies to refrain from challenging us on a conventional battlefield. However, our combat record is far from impressive in countering insurgent strategies and tactics. Consequently, insurgency and terrorism are the most likely threats to our nation for the foreseeable future.
We are facing a determined, dangerous and formidable insurgent force today; we live in a new world of international terrorism. We were required to redefine the threat to our national security in the aftermath of 9/11. Analysts and historians have concluded that one of the reasons for our failure in the Vietnam War was because our leaders had an inflexible mindset of fighting insurgents in the same manner that we battled the enemies of World War II and the Korean War. We did not adapt effectively to the changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which we were unprepared. In Vietnam the “search and destroy” tactics, the massive air strikes, and the destructive prep fires on the civilian population eventually resulted in many of the populace joining the insurgency. Instead of maintaining the people’s loyalties, we aggressively targeted and destroyed the enemy forces. Serious collateral damage resulted from the indiscriminate use of force. Vietnam civilians suffered horribly, resulting in many key hamlets being extremely unfriendly to the Government of Vietnam and the US military. Often the more force we used, the less effective was outcome.
The key to success in a counterinsurgency environment is not to create more insurgents than we capture or kill. It is essential to use force with discrete discrimination. The indigenous communities knew the insurgents; they are often tied to them through blood or marriage or long association. Long-term effects of combat operations in a counterinsurgency environment must always be considered. Killing an insurgent today may be satisfying, but if in doing so we convince all the members of his clan to fight you to death, we will fail in the final analysis. Casualties among the non-combatants, rather than the insurgents, will only serve to strengthen the insurgents’ influence over the population; the fundamental task of separating the insurgents from the people will become more difficult.
Soldiers must treat non-combatants with respect while at the same time act aggressively and independently to defeat our enemies. Distinguishing between the good guys and bad guys is not a simple task. The ability to grasp the subtleties of insurgency warfare requires astuteness and perseverance. Military efforts must connect to the overall political objectives of the host nation. The modus operandi of counterinsurgency warfare is lengthy and complex; small units are often responsible for fostering stability, political development and economic reconstruction within their area of operation. Denying the insurgents in receiving support from the civilian population is critical.
In 2005 the US Army and Marine Corps embarked on a unique joint effort to develop an innovative, contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine. A team of writers were selected from the “best and brightest” in the Army and Marines. Input and editing assistance were solicited from the State Department, FBI, CIA, scholars from academia, and representatives from the international human-rights community. The outcome was the Army FM 3-24 and the Marine Corps Fighting Publication 3-33.5 entitled, COUNTERINSURGENCY, published in December 2006.
Our son, Matt, has been recently selected as a commander of a Transition Team comprised of 15 officers and NCOs. They are currently training in the National Training Center at Ft Irwin, CA; they will be deployed early next month (August 2008) and embedded into an Afghanistan Army combined-arms battalion. The new counterinsurgency doctrine in FM 3-24 will be scrutinized during this assignment.
General George W. Casey, Jr., the Chief of Staff of the Army, recently sent out a message stating: “Soldiers that serve on our Transition Teams are developing exactly the type of knowledge, skills and abilities that are vital for our Army to be effective in an era of persistent conflict. These are tough, demanding positions; the members of these teams are required to influence indigenous or surrogate forces as they execute missions that are of vital interest to this Nation. The tasks associated with Transition Teams, from direct combat to stability operations, will be a major part of the full spectrum engagement in theaters of interest now and in the foreseeable future.”